This article examines the effect of different other-regarding preference types on the emergence of altruistic punishment behavior from an evolutionary perspective. Our findings corroborate, complement, and interlink the experimental and theoretical literature that has shown the importance of other-regarding behavior in various decision settings. We find that a selfish variant of inequity aversion is sufficient to quantitatively explain the level of punishment observed in contemporary experiments: If disadvantageous inequity aversion is the predominant preference type, altruistic punishment emerges in our model to a level that precisely matches the empirical observations. We use a new approach that closely combines empirical results from a public goods experiment together with an evolutionary simulation model. Hereby we apply ideas from behavioral economics, complex system science, and evolutionary biology.
The convergence of individual behaviors to common norms and the punishment of norm violators is an often observed pattern in groups of animals and human societies [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] . From small cliques, to the social order in groups and tribes, all the way to the legal frameworks of countries, punishment is a widespread mechanism underlying the formation of common norms [6, 7, 8] . In particular, altruistic punishment, i.e., the punishment of norm violators at one's own cost without personal benefit, is frequent in social dilemmas and is often used to explain the high level of cooperation in humans [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] . Within standard economic theory, which relies on rational selfishness and the dominance of self-regarding preferences, such behaviors are puzzling, if not disrupting. This observation calls for the identification of the generative mechanism(s) underlying altruistic punishment and how its occurrence may be context dependent.
Laboratory experiments and field studies suggest that egalitarian motives and other-regarding preferences, which relate a person's decision to her social environment, have a significant influence in social dilemmas and in bargaining [13, 14, 15, 16] . Several extensions of the standard economic approach provide descriptions of other-regarding preferences by postulating new terms in utility functions to account for relative income preferences, envy, inequality aversion and altruism [17, 18, 19] . While these approaches are based on plausible assumptions, their evolutionary validation remains vague and their quantitative coherence with empirical data unverified.
There is growing evidence from a variety of studies that pro-social preferences have emerged in hominids over hundreds and thousands of years, with deep roots going further back as evidenced from recent studies on primates [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] . The diversity of behavioral traits found in different human cultures may result from different evolutionary trajectories as well as distinct relative influence of the cultural versus genetic heritages [8, 25, 26] . A composite picture is emerging, according to which the perception of fairness, the reaction to unfair behavior and the individual's response to its social environment in general, are encoded both in cultural norms and in genes [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33] .
Cultural norms and genes appear to be subjected to complex coevolutionary processes occurring over a spectrum of different time scales. Cultural evolution is shaped by biological conditions, while, simultaneously, genes are altered in response to the evolutionary forces induced by the cultural context. The co-evolutionary dynamics and inter-dependencies of genes and cultural norms constitutes our starting point to understand the properties of social preferences revealed in experimental economics, field studies and, of course, in real life.
Experiments on public goods and social dilemma games provide convenient tools to study social preferences in well-defined scenarios under controlled conditions. In particular when designed with the opportunity to punish other subjects at own costs, altruistic behavior is manifested [9, 10, 35, 36, 37] . In these experiments, one can study in details what controls the predisposition of humans to bear the costs associated with punishments of free riders, and how it may improve the welfare of the group. Even in one-shot interactions in public good games for which reputation and reciprocal effects are absent, punishment, which is costly to the punisher and thus in contradiction with rational choice theory, is frequently observed [9, 10, 38] .
Here we develop computer simulations of synthetic agents within an agent-based model (ABM), that describes the long-term co-evolution of norms and genes in populations being exposed to a typical public goods dilemma. Our work can be viewed as an extension of the literature on ABM approaches to the evolution of cooperation [39, 40] . Specifically, we set our ABM to compare with the results of two public goods game experiments conducted by Fehr and Gachter [9, 10] . Our modeling strategy is to see the empirical observations in Fehr and Gachter's experiments as a snapshot within a long-term evolutionary dynamic. Our ABM mimics the norm-gene co-evolution that has occurred over hundreds and thousands of years. We calibrate our model by means of empirical data, to quantitatively identify the underlying preference types that drive the observed contemporary behavior in the corresponding dilemmas. In doing so, our goal is to determine the conditions under which agents develop spontaneously a propensity to "altruistically" punish, starting from an initial population of uncooperative non-punishers. Here, we specifically look into a set of common assumptions made by economists to account for altruistic punishment behavior within the framework of utility theory: Other-regarding preferences in form of inequality and inequity aversion.
Initialized by variants of these other-regarding preferences, the traits of our agents converge to statistically stable distributions after long transients, which are taken to describe the present-day characteristics of modern humans. In other words, the experiments of Fehr and Gachter [9, 10] are interpreted as sampling the statistically stationary characteristics of a cultural group of subjects 1 which have evolved over a long time horizon. Their response to specific social dilemma situations are then revealed through the present-day experiments. One should, however, keep in mind that other patterns of behaviors may have emerged under different norms and genetic endowments.
EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION
The design of our ABM is inspired by the two public goods game experiments conducted by Fehr and Gachter [9, 10] . In these experiments, subjects are arranged in groups of n = 4 persons. At the beginning of each period, subjects received an initial endowment of 20 monetary units (MUs). Thereafter, subjects could invest m ∈ [0, 20] MUs to a common group project, which returned g 1 = 1.6 MUs for each invested MU. The total return from the project was then equally split and redistributed to all group members. Thus, the marginal return per capita was g 1 /n = 0.4. As long as g 1 /n < 1, the game has a vivid social dilemma component and the setup is susceptible to defection through material self-interest, since it is rationally optimal not to cooperate, while the group is better off if each member cooperates. Hence one can consider the subjects' investment as their level of cooperation.
In a second extended run, subjects were additionally provided with the opportunity to punish other group members, after they have received the project return and have been informed about the individual contributions. The use of punishment was associated with costs for both parties, in which each MU spent by a punisher led to r p = 3 MUs taken from the punished subject [10] 2 . The fact that punishment is costly and that the cost to the punished one is larger (r p > 1) are important properties of the experimental design, which are thought to capture schematically many real life situations. Versions with and without punishment were played both in a partner treatment, in which the group composition did not change across periods, and in a stranger treatment. In the later, subjects were reassigned to new groups at each period and thus were only engaged in one-shot interactions during the entire runtime of the experiment. In total, the experiments were played for T 1 = 10 [9] and T 2 = 6 periods [10] respectively 3 . The data from Fehr and Gaechter as well as from several other public goods experiments [35, 36, 37] show that people, if provided the opportunity, frequently punish defectors, even if this is costly to themselves. In the case of repeated interactions, as in the partner treatment, such behavior can be explained in a standard way as resulting from a strategic optimization performed by rational selfish agents, who select the "direct reciprocity" mechanism for cooperation. What is more surprising is that strangers continue to punish at a cost to themselves even in one-shot interactions for which there is no positive material gain, even in absence of mechanisms associated with direct, indirect reciprocity and reputation building. This behavior is referred to as "altruistic punishment" to emphasize the conflict with the behavior expected from purely rational agents. The question we address here is why humans behave in a way that strictly contradicts rational choice, i.e., they continue to cooperate and punish at a cost to themselves.
THE AGENT-BASED MODEL
We extend the setup of the altruistic punishment game of Fehr and Gachter [10] to construct an ABM of a population of agents who play a public goods game with punishment, while adapting and evolving over long periods according to generic evolutionary dynamics. On the short time scales of Fehr and Gachter's experiments, the traits of the human players probed by the games can be considered fixed for each player. In contrast, our evolutionary ABM aims at determining which superordinate regime of other-regarding preferences have led our ancestors to develop traits promoting altruistic punishment behavior. These traits might again be encoded in the cultural context, in genes, or both. Thus, we let the traits evolve over time according to standard evolutionary dynamics: Adaptation, selection, crossover and mutation. In order to capture the possible evolution of the population, agents adapt and die when unfit. Newborn agents replace the dead ones, with traits taken from the pool of the other surviving agents. Starting from an initial population of agents with no cooperation and with no propensity to punish others, we will find the emergence of long-term stationary populations whose traits are interpreted to represent those probed by contemporary experiments, such as those of Fehr and Gachter.
The results presented below correspond to groups of n = 4 agents as in the Fehr and Gachter's experiments. At the beginning of the simulation (time t = 0), each agent is endowed with w i (0) = 0 MUs 4 , which represents its (human and material) capital. Each agent (i) is characterized by two traits [m i (t) : k i (t)], her level of cooperation and her propensity to punish, that are subjected to evolutionary forces.
ABM algorithm
A given simulation period t is decomposed into five sub-periods with the following chronology.
Cooperation. Each agent i chooses an amount to
contribute to the group project referred to as her level of cooperation. Combining all the contributions by all group members and splitting it equally, this leads to a return per agent given by equation (1). 4. Adaptation. Given her profit or loss (P&L) defined by equation 5 , which results from the project return minus her contribution and minus the cost of punishments, an agent may adapt her cooperation level m i (t) and her propensity to punish k i (t).
5.
Evolution. An agent whose capital drops below 0 dies and is replaced by another agent whose traits are inherited from the pool of survival agents with some additional mutation.
These five steps are now described in details.
Cooperation step
As denoted before, the first trait of a given agent is her intrinsic willingness to cooperate denoted by m i (t). At each period t, the agent i contributes m i (t) MUs to the group project. As in the lab experiment of Fehr and Gachter, each MU invested in the group project returns g 1 = 1.6 MUs to the group. Each agent receives the same return
from the group project, resulting in a first-step profit or loss of
for a given agent i equal to the difference between the project return and its contribution in period t.
Punishment step
Punishments in our ABM follow the same design as in the experiments of Fehr and Gachter [9, 10] . To choose the agents' decision rules on when and how much to punish, we are guided by figure 1 which shows the mean expenditure of a given punisher as a function of the deviation between her contribution minus that of the punished individual, as reported empirically [10] . One can observe an approximate proportionality between the amount spent for punishing the lesser contributing agent by the greater contributing agent and the pairwise difference m j (t) − m i (t) of their contributions. The figure includes data from both the partner and the stranger treatments in the two sets of experiments [9, 10] . In our ABM, this linear dependence, with threshold, is chosen to represent how an agent i decides to punish another agent j by spending an amount given by
FIG. 1: Mean expenditure of a given punishing member as a function of the deviation between her contribution minus that of the punished member, for all pairs of subjects within a group, as reported empirically [10] . The straight line crossing zero shows the average decision rule for punishment that our agents spontaneously evolve to at long times. Its slope −k ≈ −0.2 defines the average propensity k to punish (see the main text). The anomalous punishment of cooperators, corresponding to the positive range along the horizontal axis, is neglected in our model.
The coefficient k i (t), which represents the propensity to punish, is the second trait that characterizes agent i at time t. It is not fixed to the average value k ≈ 0.2 found in the experiments. It is allowed to vary from agent to agent and it evolves as a function of the successes and failures experienced by each agent, as explained below. In addition to being motivated by the data shown in figure  1 , the punishment rule (3) can be thought of as a minimalist description of proportional response to defection. We will see that, given certain fairness preferences are activated, evolution makes the punishment propensities k i (t) self-organize towards a distribution closely resembling the empirical data.
As a result of being punished the wealth of the punished agent j is reduced by the amount spend by agent i multiplied by the punishment impact factor r p . As in Fehr and Gachter's second experiment, we fix the punishment impact factor to r p = 3.
Consumption step
Consumption is introduced as a realistic driving force to select for successful agents and remove unfit ones. At each period, consumption absorbs an amount c(t) of the capital of each agent. The amount is assumed to be determined by the social context, specifically as the change of average group wealth (w(t)) over the last period:
The proportionality between consumption and income captures the evidence that, for modern societies, consumption is indeed roughly proportional to income, at least for 99% of the population that exclude the superwealthy [41, 42] . In primitive societies, larger human and material capital led also to larger consumption in the form of producing more offsprings 5 . The form of consumption (eq. 4) is intended to capture the survival needs and selection pressure that are determined relative to the social group.
Wealth balance
The total P&Lŝ i (t) of an agent i over one period of her life is thus the sum of three components: (i) Her first step P&L s i (t) from the group project (equation (2)), (ii) the MUs j =i p i→j (t) spent to punish others and (iii) the punishments r p j =i p j→i (t) received from others, where p i→j (t) and p j→i (t) are given by (3):
Equation 5 represents the second step P&L of agent i in period t. Putting this all together, the wealth (fitness) of agent i thus increases or decreases at each period t according to
Adaptation Dynamics
The traits [m i (t); k i (t)] characterizing each agent i at a given time t evolve with time according to standard evolutionary dynamics: Adaptation, selection, crossover and mutation. As has been argued (e.g. by Arthur [43] or Holland [44] ), humans (and our ancestors) are likely to use inductive reasoning to make decisions. In particular, this means that humans tend to replace working hypotheses with new ones when the old ones cease to work. We adopt this bounded rational approach to define adaptation rules determining the propensity to punish and the level of cooperations chosen by agents.
Adaptation of the propensity to punish. To identify which type of preference norm drive the evolution of the trait k i (t) associated with the propensity to punish to a level, that is observed in the experiments, we test a distinct set of adaption rules. Each adaption rule corresponds to a specific subset of other-regarding preference relations. Here, we specifically focus on different variants of inequality and inequity aversion preferences and therefore consider the five following types of agents: (A) self-regarding, (B) inequality averse, (C) inequity averse, (D) disadvantageous inequality averse and (E) disadvantageous inequity averse. Here "disadvantageous" indicates that agents are only inequality/inequity averse if the inequality/inequity plays to their disadvantage, whereas pure inequality or inequity avers agents dislike both, situations in which they have been discriminated as well as situations in which they discriminated others.
In each given simulation, we use only homogeneous populations, that is, we group only agents of the same type.
A: self-regarding agents: In this universe, an agent updates her propensity to punish only if her P&L s i (t) given by (5) obtained on the previous investment period turns out to be smaller than her required consumption c(t). The update consists in an unbiased random increment according to
where κ is a uniformly distributed random number drawn from the interval indicated in the subscript. Only draws of κ's that ensure positiveness of k i (t + 1) are allowed.
B: inequality averse agents: In this universe, an agent i updates her propensity to punish if her P&L s i (t) given by (5) is not within a specific tolerance range [−l, +l] around the average P&L of the other members of her group, i.e. if (ŝ i (t) <s(t) − l) or (ŝ i (t) >s(t) + l). When this occurs agent i updates her k i (t) according to equation (7) . We run multiple simulations initialized by different values for l as presented in the results section.
C: inequity averse agents: In this universe, agents set their P&L in relation to their contributions: An agent i updates her propensity to punish according to eq. (7), if...
(upside inequity) ...she has contributed less than or equally to her group fellows (m i (t) ≤m(t)), where the averagem(t) is performed over the contributions of the other members of her group and, at the same time, has received a total P&Lŝ i (t) defined in (5) larger than or equal to the group average (ŝ i (t) ≥s(t)), where the averages(t) is performed over the other group members)...
(downside inequity) ...or she has contributed more than or equally to her group fellows (m i (t) ≥m(t)) and, at the same time, has received a total P&L less than or equal to the group average (ŝ i (t) ≤s(t)).
D: disadvantageous inequality averse agents: In this universe, agents only dislike situations in which the inequality is to their's disadvantage:
(downside inequality) An agent i updates her propensity to punish only if her P&Lŝ i (t) given by (5) is smaller than the average P&L of the other members of her group, i.e. (ŝ i (t) <s(t)). When this occurs for an agent i, she updates her k i (t) according to equation (7).
E: disadvantageous inequity averse agents: Likewise to setup (C), agents set their P&L in relation to their contributions, however they only dislike situation in which the inequity is detrimental to them.
(downside inequity) If an agent i has contributed equally or more than her fellows in the group (m i (t) ≥m(t)) and, at the same time, has received a total P&Lŝ i (t) defined in (5) smaller than or equal to the group average (ŝ i (t) ≤s(t)), then she updates her propensity to punish according to eq.
.
Adaptation of the cooperation level. Following the proverb "necessity is the mother of all invention," agents adapt their cooperation level m i (t) under adverse conditions, i.e., when their P&L in the last investment round is smaller than the required consumption c(t). When this adverse situation occurs, an agent randomly updates her contribution according to m i (t + 1) = m i (t) + ǫ [−0.005,0.005] , where ǫ is a random number uniformly distributed in the interval indicated in the subscript. 7 Since contributions are non-negative, only those draws of ǫ are kept that ensure the positiveness of m i (t + 1).
Replicator Dynamics: Selection, crossover and mutation
In addition to the adaptation of the agents' traits [m i (t); k i (t)] described above, evolution occurs by replacing under-performing agents. When an agent's wealth w i (t) drops below zero, the agent dies and is replaced by a new one with different traits [m i (t + 1), k i (t + 1)], determined by those of the surviving agents of the group. The following variants give essentially the same results.
• To capture the phenomenon that norms and genes are inherited from the pool of existing agents, a first variant assumes that the new agent has her traits simply equal to the average of those of the surviving agents.
• A second variant consists in assuming a noisy inheritance of the average traits of the group members. Specifically, the new agent has traits equal to the average of those of the surviving agents plus a noise proportional to the standard deviation of the surviving agents' traits.
• A third variant first determines clusters among the agents, including the newborn, using a standard clustering algorithm on the vectors of the two traits. The existence of several clusters is taken to account for the possible emergence of heterogeneous sets of norms within the group. Then, the newborn takes the average traits of the agents in her cluster, decorated by an additional mutation implemented by adding a random number to each trait proportional to the standard deviation of the surviving agents' traits.
THE EMERGENCE OF ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT
We have run our ABM with thousands of independent groups of n = 4 agents over one million simulation periods t. The agents have a double peak distribution of lifetimes, with a mean of the order of 1.7 · 10 4 periods and a median of the order of 1.5 · 10 4 periods 8 . This expresses that, while many agents die at an early age, also many survive beyond their "childhood", enabling them to adapt their traits. Each run thus corresponds to several hundreds of generations. Each simulation has been initialized with all agents being uncooperative nonpunishers, i.e., k i (0) = 0 and m i (0) = 0 for all i's. After a long transient, we observe that the distribution of propensities to punish converges to different stationary functions depending on which adaptation dynamics (A,B,C,D or E) for k is active.
In the following we give a qualitative analysis of our simulation results. Selfish agents adapting their propensity to punish according to dynamics (A) remain weak punishers, and no significant "altruistic punishment" is observed as shown in the inset of figure 2.
In contrast, for agents endowed with inequality or inequity aversion (adaptation rules B to E), stationary states of the propensity to punish emerge spontaneously, each with different characteristics. For all adaptation rules (B to E) it holds, that altruistic punishment has emerged endogenously as an evolutionary stable trait in the competitive resource-limited world described by our model. The responsible key ingredients are the variants of other-regarding preferences (B,C,D or E). It should be stressed that a symmetric (upside and downside) inequity/inequality aversion is not needed as a condition to let altruistic punishment emerge. The selfish disadvantageous inequality or inequity aversion (dynamics D and E) is sufficient.
We now turn to a quantitative characterization of the properties of the altruistic cooperators that evolved in our ABM. Figure 2 compares the stationary distributions of the propensities to punish obtained with our ABM at long times for the four adaptation dynamics (B to E) with that obtained in Fehr and Gachter's experiment 9 . The propensities to punish in the experimental data have been inferred as follows: Knowing the contributions m i > m j of two subjects i and j and the punishment level p i→j of subject i on subject j, the propensity to punish characterizing subject i is determined by
Applying this recipe to all pairs of subjects in a given group, we obtain twelve measures of propensities to punish per group. We then take the average over these twelve values to obtain a single robust estimation associated with a given group. Sampling all groups and all periods, we obtain the distribution shown in figure 2 (continuous thick line (emp)). Figure 2 suggests that the adaptation dynamics E (disadvantageous inequity averse agents) is the only one able to fit the empirical distribution. Indeed, the KolmogorovSmirnov test cannot reject the hypothesis that the k values evolved in our ABM world for the adaptation dynamics E and the empirical values are drawn from the same distribution at the 80% confidence level (p-value ≃ 0.2). In contrast, the other adaptation dynamics A to D are strongly rejected (p-value = 0). Given the simplicity of our ABM and of its underlying assumptions, it is striking to find such detailed quantitative agreement for one of our dynamics.
For selfish agents (dynamics A), we found that the weak level of punishment that evolved in the ABM is entirely controlled by selection pressure, and thus the presence of consumption. In particular, in the absence of any selection pressure, the level of altruistic punishment
FIG. 2: Distributions of propensities to punish in Fehr and
Gachter's experiments (emp) and in our ABM at long times under the five different adaptation dynamics (A to E) under 800 system realizations. The inset shows the smoothed distribution for the self-regarding agent population (adaptation dynamics A), while the main frame plots the smoothed distributions obtained by the adaptation rules B to E as well as for the empirical data (emp). All distributions has been smoothed by a standard kernel method. (emp): Distribution estimated from Fehr and Gachter's experiments using the procedure explained in the text; the other distribution estimates correspond to the adaptation dynamic A to E. For adaptation dynamic (B) the plot shows the obtained distributions for all tolerance range parameters l ∈ 0.1; 0.075; 0.05; 0.025; 0 (from the mode close to the origin (l = 0.1) to the mode farthest (l = 0). The parameters of our ABM simulations are: n = 4, g1 = 1.6, rp = 3. drops to zero. In all other cases, it remains too small to explain the empirical results of Fehr and Gachter. For the inequality averse population (B) it become obvious, that within a symmetric variation of the tolerance range parameter l the empirical distribution can not be reproduces: Figure 2 shows the resulting distributions for the tested values l ∈ [0; 0.025; 0.05; 0.075; 0.1] as thin dashed lines, with l = 0.1 corresponding to the mode close to the origin going stepwise to l = 0 with the mode farthest from the origin. For inequity avers agents (dynamics C) and disadvantageous inequality averse agents (dynamics D), we find levels of altruistic punishments that far exceed the empirical evidence. Our quantitative comparison with Fehr and Gachter's experiments supports the hypothesis that human subjects are well-described as being disadvantageous inequity averse, corroborating and complementing previous evidence [17, 18, 19] . The results obtained with our ABM simulations suggest that the co-evolution of norms and genes promoting altruistic punishment have been influenced by disadvantageous inequity aversion in the presence of simple inductive strategies, leading to self-sustained co-evolving traits made robust by reinforcing feedbacks.
The distribution of propensities k i to punish exhibits a mode around k = 0.2, which means that most punishers spend an amount approximately equal to one-fifth of the experienced differences in contributions. Note that the value of the mode around k = 0.2 is close to the slope of the straight line fitting the empirical data shown in figure 1 providing another confirmation of the explanatory power of our ABM. This most probable value k = 0.2 has also been obtained analytically by assuming an evolutionary optimization of the expected gains with respect to potential future losses due to punishment [34] .
THE EFFECT OF THE PROPENSITY TO PUNISH ON COOPERATION
We now demonstrate with our model that punishment is a key stabilization mechanism for sustaining cooperation. For this, we need some destabilizing process that tends to destroy cooperation in the absence of punishment. The experiments of Fehr and Gachter suggest such a mechanism. A detailed analysis of the periodby-period decision outcomes made by human subjects shows evidence of short-term persistence in their updates of cooperation levels: Previous changes m i (t − 2) → m i (t − 1) of contributions that led to larger return from the project (s i (t − 1) > s i (t − 2)) are followed by subsequent updates m i (t − 1) → m i (t), with the same trend:
. We refer to this behavior as using a "trend-following strategy."
When we add the trend-following strategy to our 4-step algorithm as described above but, in the absence of punishment (all k's are imposed equal to 0), we find that cooperation that was maintained previously in the presence of punishment decays after a few thousand periods as shown in figure 3 . In contrast, if punishment is restored in the presence of the destabilizing trend-following strategy, cooperation remains stable. Note also that the emergence of the stable distribution of propensity to punish reported in figure 2 is robust to the addition of the trend-following strategies used by the agents. Figure 4 shows the average level of cooperation in a group of 4 agents after a transient period of 20,000 simulation periods for 800 system realizations as a function of the propensity k to punish, when the level of cooperation for all agents is initially drawn from a uniformly distributed random variable in {49, 51}. It reveals that the level of cooperation undergoes a bifurcation from zero to significant levels of cooperation, for a value of k close to the mode of the empirical distribution of the propensities to punish. This suggests that evolution may have selected an "optimal" propensity to punish altruistically defectors in order to sustain cooperation. 
FIG. 4:
Average group contribution for a group of 4 agents as a function of k after an equilibrium time of 20000 simulation periods and 800 system realizations. k is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution mi(0) for all agents i of a group is randomly drawn form a uniform distribution in {49, 51}.
To corroborate this hypothesis, figure 5 plots the average amount of MUs spent to punish a defector during 10000 simulation periods for 3200 system realizations as a function of the propensity to punish k. As in the setup of figure 4 , the level of cooperation m i (t) for all agents is initialized at period t = 0 by a random variable uniformly distributed in {49, 50}. We now consider the intrinsic propensity to punish k as the potential exposure of defectors to being punished. The results show clearly, that a higher deterrence, i.e. a higher value of k, effectively causes less exertion of costly punishment in order to maintain a certain level of cooperation and norm con- formity, respectively. This responsive behavior has been manifested in many empirical observations [46, 47] .
Given, that disadvantageous inequity aversion is the dominant preference type, cooperation and norm conformity can be maintained at lower costs if the propensity to punish, i.e. the level of deterrence, exceeds the tipping point of k at ≃ 0.2. This again substantiates, that evolution may have selected an "optimal" propensity to punish to sustain cooperation and prevent defection in contexts where people behave disadvantageous inequity averse. Comparable results have been obtain using a different simulation model as has been reported in [45] .
CONCLUSION
Our first principal result is that a high level of altruistic punishment behavior emerges spontaneously from a population of agents who are initially uncooperative and non-punishers. We have shown how this results from evolution with adaptation, selection, crossover and mutation, in a population of agents endowed with different variants of inequality or inequity aversion. We stress that our use of the terms "inequality" or "inequity aversion" does not mean that a new term is added in the agents' utility function that controls their decisions; in contrast, we only assume that agents may punish as a reaction to differences in observed contributions to a group project. Thus, a key ingredient is the possibility for agents to punish, at a cost to themselves, and that the punishment be efficient (in the sense r p > 1). As a consequence of the coevolution of traits characterizing agents' cooperation and punishment, we obtain the emergence of altruistic punishment behavior. A fully symmetric (upside and down-side) inequity/inequality aversion is not needed to obtain our results, with the selfish disadvantageous inequality or inequity aversion being sufficient.
Our second main result is the identification of disadvantageous inequity aversion as the most relevant underlying mechanism to explain the emergence and the degree of altruistic punishment observed in public goods experiments. This result has been obtained by combining empirical data with an evolutionary agent-based simulation model in an innovative way. Our ABM is able to reproduce quantitatively, without adjustable parameters, the experimental results concerning the most likely levels of punishment behavior, as well as their full distribution. This result is of particular importance to substantiate the assumptions made by economists in order to describe realistic behavior within the framework of rational choice: Humans exhibit other-regarding, and in particular, disadvantageous inequity aversion preferences in their decision process.
In conclusion, we believe that the combination of empirical research and agent-based modeling as done here can provide deeper insights into the apparently nonrational behavior of humans. For instance, with regard to the often-cited importance of altruistic punishment in promoting cooperation, our ABM provides a flexible and powerful methodology to answer many remaining research questions, including the influence of group interactions, competitions between variants of other-regarding preferences or the interplay of other mechanisms, as well as more realistic set-ups in which agents are playing several games simultaneously so as to mimic a real life situation in which cognitive abilities and human capital are scarce resources.
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